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-6Introduction and Summary of Argument
Introduction
This case should be viewed honestly for what it is: an attempt by
a noncustodial father who has not visited one child since the Appellant,
Kathleen Hamby, left him in October, 1984, and who may not have even
ever seen the other child, born in April, 1985, to impose his surname
on the two children he sired with Ms. Hamby to whom he was briefly
married.
The man, Gail Jacobson, is usually unemployed, has a drinking problem and is known for fighting. He physically abused the one child during the 10-11 months Ms. Hamby lived with him in marriage. He gave no
testimony whatsoever, let alone testimony to the effect that his interest in having the children bear his name, rather than their mother's,
was their interests, let alone their "best" interests. His counsel only
"proffered" the following as his rationale for insisting that his offspring bear his last name:
"We also, of couse, would dispute the legal conclusions as have
been stated here and we would also have evidence that the defendant,
while he wouldn't qualify for sainthood, nevertheless, his conduct
is not such as would in any way be so unreasonable or outlandish
that would require the Court in the interest of the children to
take his name from them. Even if it were, even if his behavior were
negative m some respects, likewise the applicant's character and behavior is negative. We won't want to get into that. I think the Court
indicated that would not be an issue. So we would submit it on that
statement of our proffer that if lie were called to make evidence
that is what our evidence would be." (Respondent's Brief at A-9)(emphasis
added).
Furthermore, far from accepting a neutral and equal burden of proof
for both parties with respect to the children's "best interests," the
trial court put the burden on Ms. Hamby to demonstrate why the children
should not bear the paternal name. Mr. Jacobson's counsel argued the
i name marital r.h-ildrpn.tpi
father's right toytne trial court and at the end of his Brief, the
Respondent summarized the burden with which he would saddle Ms. Hamby
to overcome the traditional finding for the patronymic:

-7"Appellant Kathleen Hamby failed to introduce sufficient evidence
to justify the unorthodox, disruptive and potentially punitive
selection of surnames £ sic} upon which she was insisting."
Respondent's Brief at p.44.
Even under the traditional standards/factors developed by the courts
in the past to prevent older children who were originally given their
fathers1 surnames, which their mothers also used, to assume stepfathers'
names over the objection of their natural fathers, no trial court in the
country in the 1980s should have awarded the right of naming the children
to such a parent so that an appeal to a higher court would be necessary.
The abuse of the trial court in this case is simply reprehensible. Yet,
the instant situation is typical of cases occurring in trial courts
across the nation as the law recognizes that men can no longer enjoy a
superior right to name (marital) children. The Court is again referred
to three articles and the cases and legal commentary cited in the same.
MacDougall, "The Right of Women To Name Their Children,11 3 Journal of
Law and Inequality 91(1985); Foggan, "Parents' Selection of Children's
Surnames," 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 583 (1983), and Comment, "No Judicial
Dyslexia: The Custodial Parent Presumption Distinguishes the Paternal
From the Parental Right To Name a Child," 58 N.D.L. Rev. 793(1982).
The purpose of this Reply is to respond to the numerous inaccuracies
and distortions of the issues in and facts of the instant case, and the
misconstructions and misusages of the law and legal commentrary presented
by the Respondent's venomous brief against Ms. Hamby, to discuss the
custodial parent presumption in view of the Respondent's objection to and
misunderstanding of it, and to inform the Supreme Court of Utah of recent
cases involving the naming of infant or very young children.
The arguments of Ms. Hamby on behalf of herself and her children
are discussed in her Initial Brief, are mostly not responded to by the
Respondent, and are not reiterated herein except in response to some
of the contentions in the Re^pndent's Brief.

-8Summary of Argument
Preliminarily, instead of moving the Supreme Court for an Order to
strike all the references to Ms. Hamby's character and presumed motives
and actions proffered by the Respondent's counsel

throughout his Brief

which are not supported by evidence of record, Ms. Hamby is requesting
that the Supreme Court disregard the same in considering the appeal before
it. These and other inexcusable errors made in Respondent's Brief respecting the issues and facts in the case will be pointed out in this
Reply.
Also preliminarily, although the transcript of court proceedings on
October 24, 1985 should certainly be in the record of this case (as has
been stipulated by the parties), testimony that has only been "proffered"
through lawyers as conclusive without the benefit of clarifying questioning and the right of cross examination should not be accepted by any
court of law as actual evidence. The Appellant asks the Supreme Court
to disregard such unheard of "proffer" of evidence as actual evidence.
The transcript is included in the Respondent's Brief, A-5--A-11.
Second, it should be noted that the parties are in agreement as to
two issues:
1. The parties agree that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the dispute between the custodial and noncustodial parents
over the infants' names in this case pursuant to its continuing
jurisdiction over the care, custody and control of children provided by Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code.
Except to point out that the Respondent is incorrect in stating on
page 42 of his brief that "The jurisdiction of the lower court has
never been contested by anyone. There is no jurisdictional issue for
the Supreme Court of Utah to decide1,' this point will not be pursued
further. The Supreme Court is referred to pages 29-32 of the Appellant's
Initial Brief and "The Right of Women To Name Their Children," pages
133-136. To guide the trial courts of Utah in future cases, the Court
is respectfully requested to articulate the authority of Utah's lower

-9courts to entertain similar cases in the future.
2. The parties are also in agreement that the legal standard for
resolving a dispute between parents over their children's names is
the "best interests of the child."
Respondent states as an issue whether the trial court committed reversible error in "applying" the "best interests of the child" standard
and "rejecting" Appellant's claim of a unilateral right to name the
children involved. This is not a correct statement of the issue.
Counsel for the Respondent either misunderstands or intentionally
misconstrues the Appellant's position in this regard and the custodial
parent presumption as set forth by Justice Mosk in In re Schiffman, 28
Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980) as a means for
applying the "best interests" standard. A presumption that the custodial
parent acts in a child's best interests in determining what name a child
should use, as well as in all other aspects of childrearing, is a sexneutral means by which the standard of the "best interests of the child"
can be judicially applied.
Third, in addition to ignoring the trend of the nation's courts in
naming disputes to rule in favor of the custodial parent's choice of name
in cases involving infant or very young children, the Respondent ignores
the distinction between disputes between parents over the naming of
infant/very young children and those, between parents over the renaming
of older children who were originally given the patronymic which both
parents used with the children in a family unit for a substantial period
of time.
This distinction between determining a child's name at birth, or
when a child is an infant or very young, and changing it after the
child has borne the name for several years, is all important. The standards
and factors which were developed by courts and discussed by legal commentators before the 1980s as a means to keep older children from adopting
the surnames of stepfathers over their natural fathers' wishes,-either

pursuant to an alleged "best interests11 standard or in open deference
to a divorced father's "right" to have his offspring continue to bear his
surname—are simply not applicable to situations involving the initial/
infancy naming of children. Respondent's use of caselaw involving older
children is misplaced and misleading.
Further, the Respondent's contention that Ms. Hamby should be saddled
with the burden of demonstrating why the children should not bear the
paternal surname derives from the aforementioned caselaw which was developed to prevent older children's changes of name.
Fourth, a disturbing contention of the Respondent is that children
should not use their mother's surname as a matter of policy if the mother's
name was acquired during a prior marriage.
Even if Utah's Legislature were to adopt such a policy, it would be
in direct conflict with the common law and the Constitution of the United
States. See Doe v. Dunning, 87 Wash. 2d 50, 549 P. 2d 1(1976); Jech v.
Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714 (D. Hawaii 1979); O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp.
494 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell,
373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E. 2d 717(1977); Initial Brief, pages 21-28. Utah
follows the common/constitutional law in this regard.

The current Guide-

lines for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on the Birth
Certificate (revised October 5, 1981) state

simply that "The surname to

be given the child should be determined by the parents...When the child's
mother is not married, she has considerable latitude in the name she gives
the child. Even if the father is not named on the birth certificate, the
mother may give the child a surname different than her own surname... and
give the child a surname different than the father's."

Argument
I. Under any standard, the facts of this case do not support a finding
that the children's best interests will be served by their bearing their
father's, rather than their mother's, surname.
As set forth in the Introduction, the Respondent Gail Jacobson has not
set foot in court in this matter: he(andhis counsel) has given absolutely
no testimony about why the children in Ms, Hamby's custody should bear
his, rather than their mother's, surname. His counsel argued to the trial
court that as the biological father of the children involved, Mr. Jacobson
has "a common law right to have the child bear his name if he's going to
be ordered to support and determined to be the father of the child." R.
131. See also R. 147-148. At a subsequent proceeding on October 24, 1985,
his counsel "proffered" the testimony set forth, supra.
The Respondent is a man who is usually unemployed, who has a drinking
problem and reputation for fighting, who has been in arrears in his child
support obligations in the past and who physically abused and caused injury to one of the children during the brief time he lived with Ms. Hamby
in marriage. At the time of the evidentiary hearing in March, 198 5, Mr.
Jacobson had not even visited the child since Ms. Hamby left five months
prior thereto (R. 140, Reply Brief, A-140). There is no evidence that Mr.
Jacobson has even ever seen, let alone visited with or cared for, the
child born subsequent to the hearing in March, 198 51 At the October 24,
1985 proceeding, several months late,r, his counsel did not even "proffer"
that he has.
The Respondent repeatedly claims that Ms. Hamby and Mr. Jacobson
agreed to name the children with the name Jacobson (see, e.g. Respondent' s
Brief at pages 9, 28 and 37). Ms. Hamby's live testimony does not at all,
however, support that contention. Indeed, although such an agreement
during the marriage would have no bearing on a determination of the child's
best interests months later, Ms. Hamby was in court two days before delivering her last child testifying that she considered it in the children's
best interests to bear the same name as the rest of her family unit, Hamby,

-II-

and not Jacobson. At the evidentiary hearing Ms. Hamby testified about
agreeing to send paternity papers into the State (R. 128, 132; Reply
Brief, A-9 and A-13) in order to put Mr. Jacobson1s name on the child's
birth certificate as the father (R. 132; Reply Brief, A-13). She testified
about writing to the State about the name and being told she did not have
to change the child's birth certificate name in order for him to benefit
from any Social Security benefits from Mr. Jacobson in the event of
death. R. 137-138; Reply Brief, A-18-19).
Respondent's attempt to create an agreement such as present in a clause
«vCQurt approved A
of aySSpiirdtion agreement at issue in Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.
2d 356 (1985) (Respondent's Brief at p. 37), is a distortion of the facts.
Even in yesteryear when courts always found a way to find for the patronymic as being in the child's "best interests" or as a "right" of the
father, under the facts of this case it is unlikely that Mr. Jacobson
could have prevailed in imposing his name on the children he sired with
Ms. Hamby. This case should not have reached the appellate level; any
fair minded trial court should have seen the horror of the situation and
approved the mother's judgment instead of causing her to appeal to a
higher court.
Or so the Appellant would hope. The traditional cases of yesteryear,
and those which follow them, which legal commentators are united in
criticizing as having made it virtually impossible for divorced/remarried
women to change their children's names over the objection of their exhusbands, seldom involved infant children. This discriminatory caselaw
involving older children, which Respondent cites throughout his brief
in support of his position that the children should bear his, rather
2
than their mother's name, developed in factual contexts not relevant to
naming children at birth or when they are very young. See Initial Brief
at page 26.
2
E.g., Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540 P. 2d 1277(1975); In re Spatz
258 N.W. Zd 814(Neb.l977); In re Tubbs, 620 P. 2d 384 (Okl. 1980). "
'

A. Respondent ignores the fact that the trial court did not support
his conclusions with evidentiary findings"
Just stating that something is so does not magically make everything
right in the world. The trial court stated factual conclusions, but no
facts upon which they were based. The conclusions are not supported by
the evidence in the case; indeed, they are contrary to it.
Significantly, the trial court made no finding that Mr. Jacobson
has/had expressed any interest in the children or, indeed, even seen
the child born in April, 1985. The trial court's findings were oriented
only towards perpetuating the patronymic as a general principle.
To argue that the trial court made genuine findings of fact borders
on the ludicrous.
B. The "proffer" of evidence by the parties' lawyers on behalf of
their clients cannot be considered as record evidence.
The transcript of the proceedings last October, 1985 has been admitted
into the record by stipulation since the filing of the Initial Brief. In
it the lawyers' "proffers" of what their clients would testify to if
they actually testifed are transcribed.
Surely, such "proffers" of evidence are not acceptable as actual
evidence in Utah courts. Appellant knows of no procedural or evidentiary
authority in Utah or elsewhere that provides that "proffers" of evidence
by lawyers on behalf of clients without the benefit of clarifying
questioning or the right of cross examination be admitted into evidence.
The Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the
State of Utah and the Fourth Judicial District Court Administrative
Orders Effecting Procedures and Practice

contain none.

If there is authority for such a practice in Utah, the Supreme Court
is respectfully asked to articulate it for the benefit of trial court
practice in Utah.
Ms. Hamby's actual testimony respecting any alleged agreement over
the naming of the children conflicts with her counsel's "proffered"
evidence. The "proffered evidence" should be disregarded.

C. All the Respondent's derogatory references to Ms. Hamby's
character, actions and motives, which are not supported by the
record in this case, should be disregarded by the Utah Supreme
Court.
Throughout its brief the Respondent makes derogatory and misleading
statements about Kathleen Hamby's character, motives, actions and testimony
which are not part of the record and which should be disregarded by the
Supreme Court.
Ms. Hamby is asking the Supreme Court to disregard the same rather
than taking the Court's time to consider a Motion to Strike Matter Not
Included in the Record.
One page 13 of his brief, the Respondent refers to counsel's "proffer"
of evidence that "Kathleen's character and behavior was fsic] negative
also" as if it were fact and evidence of record. This should be disregarded
One page 36 of his brief, the Respondent states:
"...it was both prudent and appropriate for the district court to take
into account the fact that they would have the opportunity (undoubtedly
heavily influenced by their custodial mother) when they reached an
age of discretion to initiate a proceeding to change their surname
'if they wanted to.'"
Ms. Hamby herself brought up that she would never stand in the way
of her children changing their names when they are older. R. 140-141;
Reply, A-21-22. Respondent's parenthetical comment is contrary to the
actual testimony of Ms. Hamby and impugns her integrity without basis,
Psrhapsit is projection.
On page 39 of his brief, Respondent states that "the record reveals
a punitive motive on the part of Appellant, Kathleen Hamby " because she
testified that Mr. Jacobson £ by his not working, his drunkedness, his
violence, etcf] "has put me in a position now to raise three children by
myself, because it's his choice not to be a husband that I can stay with."
This accusation of motive should not be accepted.
One page 40 of his brief the Respondent refers to Ms. Hamby as
"blaming Mr. Jacobson for physical injury to her middle child." The
evidence is uncontraverted that Mr. Jacobson caused physical injury to the

child. Mr. Jacobson's lawyer did not even try to "proffer" evidence that
he did not.
On page 40 Respondent also states in parenthesis that Ms. Hamby compared
Mr. Jacobson to her former husband ("against whom Mr. Jacobson compared
during his marriage to the Appellant").
There is nothing remotely in the record of this case relating to
whether Ms. Hamby compared Mr. Jacobson to her prior husband any more
than there is evidence respecting Mr. Jacobson's comparing Ms. Hamby to
his former wife. Such evidence would be irrelevant anyway.
These statements on page 40 of Respondent's brief should be disrearded.
The Respondent further states on page 40 that:
"It is also noteworthy that when she divorced her former husband,
she did not insist upon changing the name of the child they had,
whose custody was awarded to her."
There is no evidence in the record as to the circumstances of Ms.
Hamby's first marriage and her reasons for not changing her name after
her divorce several years ago. As divorce and remarriage become common
in the United States more and more women are not changing their surnames
every time they undergo a change in marital status any more than men do not
In her Initial Brief Appellant cites caselaw involving the right of
women to not change their names following divorce and remmariage. Many
women retain names acquired during prior marriages even when they remarry.
Pearl Buck and Ellen Goodman are but two examples. Respondent's statement
has no relevance and should be disregarded.
And, on pages 40-41 Respondent states:
"Since the surname by which a child should be known after his
parents' divorce ought not to be resolved on the basis of spite,
punishment, or animosity, the attitude and statements of the
Appellant detract from the weight and credibility of her contention
that the children should bear the surname of her former husband 'Hamby.'
Such a mischaracterization of Ms. Hamby's testimony is unconscionable
and should be disregarded. Further, the insulting characterization here
and elsewhere in his b£%ef of Ms. Hamby?s

nam

© as her former husband's and

-15not hers, particulatly in light of Ms. Hambyfs affidavit to the Supreme
Court respecting her name, is a low blow which should be seen for what
it is and disregarded.
As if the foregoing assaults on Ms. Hambyfs character were not enough,
Respondent claims on page 41 that:
"the controversy arises because the custodial mother wants to
terminate and cut-off all ties which the noncustodial father
has with his children."
From the evidence of record it does not appear that Mr. Jacobson has
any ties except a few dollars a month of child support. Respondent's
mischaracterization of Ms. HambyTs intention should be disregarded.
See, e.g., R. 140; Reply, A-21.
Adding insult to injury Respondent states on page 41:
"If the sole question were the best interests of Kathleen Hamby,
she might arguably persuade the court that the children should
bear her surname because she would be happier, avenged or so forth."
This statement should be disregarded.
On page 34 Respondent claims:
"Moreover, Ms. Hamby has been known by three different names during
the past years. She has been married twice, and each time assumed
the surname of her husband upon marriage. If she should marry a
third time, there is no reason to believe that she would not assume
the surname of her third husband upon marriage."
This statement, in view of Ms. Hambyfs Affidavit in Support of Motion
For Change of Title of Action, referred to by Respondent in his brief,
is simply unconscionable. Ms. Hamby has born her surname for at least
twelve years (her oldest child was eleven at the time of the October, 1985
proceeding) minus the 10-11 months she lived with Mr. Jacobson. In her
Affidavit (reproduced in the Addendum to this Reply) she states that
"I consider it fHambyj my name and I never intend to use any surname
than Hamby for the duration of my natural life." Reply, A-53-54.

II. Respondent misunderstands, or miscontstrues,, the custodial
parent presumption as set forth in the concurring opinion of Justice
Stanley Mosk in In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169
Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980). The presumption provides a sex-neutral means
by which courts can apply the standard of the "best interests of the child.
Respondent does not appear to understand the presumption as articulated
by the nationally distinguished Justice Mosk. Respondent writes:
"the leading authority cited for her proposition is a concurring
opinion of one justice stating what he thought the rule should
be in a case in which the California Supreme Court expressly adopted
another rule--the best interests of the child standard." at p. 22.
Respondent first claims that the presumption differs from the best
interests standard. Second, he claims that the presumption is a "thinly
disguised attempt at gender discrimination" because 901 of all (presumbably both marital and nonmarital) children live with their mothers
in single parent situations, (p. 38). Third, he claims that the presumption "is a legislative, not a judicial,pdlicy-decision responsibility"
(page 23). Fourth, with reference to three states which have legislation
to prevent changes of children's names over the objections of the noncustodial parent (Indiana, Louisiana and Virginia), he favors such
legislation over a custodial presumption "as an incentive to make noncustodial parents Ti.e. fathers!to support and maintain contact with
their children."(p.24). Fifth, he claims that the custodial parent presumption would create "a significant obstacle"to parents reaching voluntary custody agreements, (p. 24). ,
Respondent's concerns are misplaced. First, the presumption is not
different

from a best interests standard, but is a means to assure the

same consistent with traditional black letter family law principles that
the custodial parent, entrusted with the care, custody and control of
children, acts in children's best interests in all areas of childrearing,
including the naming of children.
In the landmark case of In re Schiffman, the California Supreme Court
became the forerunner in this area of the law in expressly overruling
all its precedent recognizing the primary right of men to name marital

-17children, caselaw which had developed in the familar context of children
who were originally given the paternal name, and adopted the Mbest interestsM standards for resolving disputes over children's names. Justice
Mosk concurred in this opinion and, in an opinion of high scholarship
which has been received favorably by law review commentary and highly
respected, if not expressly adopted by courts , set forth a means by
to apply the best interests standard:
"Thus it would seem that a parent deemed fit to have custody ordinarily
should be deemed fit to select a name that accords with the child's
best interest...The abrogation of the father's 'primary right' to have
the child bear his surname in California-as provided in the majority
opinion-requires that a genuine 'best interest' standard be implemented.
A rebuttable presumption in favor of the custodial parent's choice of
name-when custody is in the mother-would accord due weight to the
following factors which her£ofore have often been subordinated to
the father's interest at the possible expense of the child's welfare:
1) embarrassment to the child when he bears a surname different from
that of the parent with whom he resides; 2) identification of the
child as part of the current family unit, 3) support of the motherchild relationship in cases in which the custodial mother uses her
birth or previous surname." (emphasis added).
Second, Respondent evidences little knowledge of the principles of
gender discrimination in claiming that the custodial parent presumption
would constitute such. The mere fact that a facially sex-neutral provision
will affect more members of one sex than the other does not constitute
gender discrimination. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979). Men can and do seek and win custody. The Utah Legislature
abolished the "tender years doctrine" which favored women in obtaining
custody in 1977. See Initial Brief at p. 33.
In Polikoff, "Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria
Used in Child Custody Determinations," 7 Women's Rights Law Reporter 235,
236 (1982) the 90% statistic cited by Respondent is explained:
"The frequently cited statistic that 90% of all children of divorce
are in the custody of their mothers is not evidence of unfairness within
the legal system toward men. In the vast majority of cases, the
fathers do not want custody and the children remain with the mother
by parental choice. When fathers do want custody, their chances of
winning are substantial. While little hard-core data exist, the
statistics that have been gathered do not support the claims of the
'fathers' rights' movement. Lenore J. Weitzman and Ruth B. Dixon
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found in a study limited to Los Angeles County that in 1977, 63 % of
all fathers who requested custody in court papers were successful.
A study of 196 Minneapolis cases showed fathers winning 45% of the
time.. One New York family court judge awarded custody to men as
often as to women during a five-year period in the 1970s. Two researchers who surveyed North Carolina judges in 1979 found that
fathers prevailed in almost one-half of the cases. The Legal Aid
Society of Alameda County, California, reports that of thirteen
contested custody trials in 1979, fathers prevailed 38% of the time.
Furthermore, reports from attorneys and analysis of written court
opinions reveal that the fathers who are winning have not been exceptionally involved in childrearing prior to divorce."(footnotes omitte
Years ago, before the demise of the tender years presumption, the
argument that the custodial parent presumption would constitute gender
discrimination might have had validity. It no longer does. Further, the
presumption is being advocated herein for determining the names of infant
or very young children, children who have not grown up with their
fathers1 names.
Third, Respondent misleadingly cites "The Right of Women To Name
Their Children" among other things, to support its contention that the
adoption of the presumption is a legislative function and not for the
courts.
At the October 24, 1985 proceeding the trial judge stated on the
record to the parties "as I indicated to counsel in chambers, it is a
case in which I need your assistance." Respondent's Brief at A-10.
Trial courts across the nation need the same help. It is a physical
impossibility for all children's names cases to be well litigated. As is
the case with many legal reforms, improvements in the law in the naming
of children can be effectuated by several means, including judicial, legislative and administrative action and/or a combination of the same. In
Utah,for example, the Department of Health has proposed new regulations
which will provide for the custodial parent to name newborns in cases of
parental disagreement. The proposal is reproduced in the Addendum of this
Reply a A-35-37.
Fourth, Respondent's favorable reference to name change
statutes, although not unexpected, contrary to the custodial parent
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presumption as a 1980s means for resolving disputes over infant children, are
a condonation of blatant, intentional gender discrimination. The Indiana
statute, for example, was enacted to protect the changing of older
children's names. See Senate Bill No. 81 and letter respecting the
bill from Appellant's counsel to Lesley DuVall, Chair, Senate Judiciary
Committe, State of Indiana, March 5, 1979. Several years down the line,
after initial naming rights are sex-neutral, such statutes will be less
objectionable. As they are today, they provide veto power to divorced
husbands over the changing of children's names following divorce irrespecti\
of the children's best interests. Noncustodial parents in all other aspects
of childrearing are not presumed to act in their children's best interests
over the nustodial parents. Custodial parents are specifically entrusted
with the responsibility of so acting as the parents better fit to make
childrearing decisions.
Fifth, Respondent's claim that adoption of the presumption will
serve as an obstacle to voluntary custody agreements is puzzling. The
presumption will discourage litigation over children's names perhaps,
and hopefully eliminate children's names as a negotiable item to be used
in exchange for greater child support. If

the presumption will cause

men who should seek custody to do so, then it will serve an added function.
i sugpe.stinp- that ^

Is Respondent

Y^611 w ho wish to brand their children but not to really

assume day to day custodial care of them willfile fraudulent custody
actions to strong arm custodial mothers into giving up the names issue
if the presumption is adopted?
It is submitted that Respondent avoids stating his real opposition to
the custodial parent presumption: the fear that it will — as it should —
wipe out the heretofore rarely challenged male right to control the
naming of marital children.Under the guise of a "best interests" standard
or with express deference to the male"rightM to control the naming of
marital children, men have assumed the right to name their marital

children as long as they maintain some minimal contact with them.
III. Respondent ignores the trend of the nation's courts, agencies
and legislatures to approve the custodial parent's choice of name
in cases involving the naming of children at birth or when they are
very young, and erroneously uses caselaw developed to prevent the
changing of names of older children (who were originally given their
fathers' names and who lived with both parents for a substantial
period of time), to support a requirement that the infant children
in this case bear the paternal name.
Respondent ignores almost all the recent caselaw over the naming
of infant marital and nonmarital children. Since 1979, except in a
3
few cases, pursuant to a variety of theories, courts have found for
the custodial mother in disputes over naming infant children. See,
Aiken County Family Agency and Charlene DeVonne Evelyn Hoglund v.
Frank Lee Girard, No. C7-86-283, Minnesota Court of Appeals (July 23,
1986)(reproduced in the Addendum to this Reply at A-44-A-52); Bell v.
Bell,

A.D. 2d

(N.Y. 1986); Blasi v. Blasi, 648 S.W. 2d 80(Ky. 1983);

Hurta v. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. 95, 605 P. 2d 1278(1979); Jacobs v.
Jacobs, 309 N.W. 2d 303 (Minn. 1981); G.L.A. v. T.B.S., 430 N.E. 2d
433 (Ind. App. 1982); In re M.L.P. , 621 P. 2d 43Q (Tex^Ciyl App.
1981); In re Nguyen, 684 P. 2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert, denied,
105 S. Ct. 785(1985); In re Goldstein, 104 A.D. 2d 616, 479 N.Y.S. 2d
385 (1984); Rossell by Yacono,196 N.J. Super. 109 (1984); In re
Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980);
In re Schidlmeier, 496 A. 2d 1249 (Pa. Super. 1985) ( Appeal denied,
January 21, 1986). See also,State v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485, 421
N.Y.S. 2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
And in Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W. 2d 381 (1982) the
Nebraska Supreme Court attempted to provide a compromise in a dispute
involving the interpretation of that state's name selection statute,
by imposing a hyphenated name on a newborn.
Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A. 303 fMd

(i^TT^^T^^
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-21This body of law is, however, in striking contrast to the caselaw
involving the changes of older children's names.
In a recent case, Aiken County v. Girard, supra,
Court of Appeals

the Minnesota

interpreted the case of In re Saxton, 309 N.W. 2d

298 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034(1982) in a case involving two (nonmarital) children, ages four and five whose father had,
the parties agreed,''established a positive and loving relationship with
the children." The Court adopted a degree of the custodial parent presumption in deciding for the custodial mother:
"absent evidence that the change will be detrimental to the preservation of the children's relationship with their father, we see
no reason to put aside the preference expressed by their custodial
parent, the children's mother. It is in the best interest of such
young children to provide them with stability and continuity...The
preservation of the family unit as they have always known it, including having the same name as their custodial parent, is an element
of that continuity. Appellant has been and continues to be primarily
responsible for the welfare of the children.Under these circumstances,
the evidence does not show that the substantial welfare of the
children necessitates a change of name." Reply at A-6-7.
In Cohee v. Cohee, supra, the Nebraska Supreme Court accepted
custody as a factor to be considered.
And in Application of Rossell by Yacono, supra, the Superior Court of
New Jersey wrote, in awarding the right of a divorced custodial mother
to change the surname of her young son from the paternal to her birth
given surname, in a case similar to the instant one:
"The emergence of women as equals of men in our society may be our
most significant revolution. The acceptance of that emergence is
grudgingly slow: it is an acceptance which the courts must not
impede...The child is less than two years old. He has lived with
his mother almost exclusively since birth. He is too young to have
achieved any significant identification with his last name. His
father's interest in his welfare has been so modest as to be nonexistent. His father's behavior while married to his mother exhibited little regard for the loving and considerate treatment
which children have a right to expect from their father and he
has provided no proof that his behavior has changed. Under the
circumstances, Joseph Michael Thomas Rossell will be better served
in this life if he carries his mother's name." at 115-116.

Under traditional caselaw--that developed to prevent older children's
names from being changed over the objection of their fathers--the
mother had to rebut the virtually irrebuttable presumption that the
children's names should not be changed from the patronymic. If the
mother claimed that the children would be embarrassed by continuing to
bear the paternal name it was her responsibility--with an impossible
burden of proof--to show exceptional circumstances. On page 34 of his
brief Respondent states

M

In this case there was no evidence of any

exceptional circumstances" following his citation of cases involving
older children who had originally been given their fathers1 names
and lived with both parents under the same name as a family unit.
The application of these old standards, including the burden of
proof they impose on the mother, are misplaced.
IV. Respondent's position that, if a mother's name is acquired from
a previous marriage, her children who are not fathered by her exhusband should not bear the same name as a matter of policy, is contrary
to Utah law, the common law, the Constitution of the United States
and the standard of the "best interests of the child."
On page 25 of his brief Respondent refers to the fact that"Mr.
Jacobson did not object to his wife resuming the use of the surname
'Hamby,'" as if he had any right to. See, e.g., In re Banks, 4 2 Cal.
App. 3d 631, 117 Cal. Rptr. 37(1974); Egner v. Egner, 133 N.J. Super.
403, 337 A. 2d 46 (1975); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich. App.
213, 247 N.W. 2d 354(1976); Wetcker v. Wetfcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La.
App. 1977); Cowley v. Cowley, A.C. 450(1901). He continually refers
to Ms. Hamby'sya!?^11 the surname of her prior husband" (e. g. ,p. 29)
instead of as her name(which she assumed during a prior marriage).
He refers, on page 43, to Ms. Hamby's^eeking to name her children with
"the surname of one of her previous husbands" as if she has had numerous
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marriages and, again, in derogation of her having her own name.
He argues that the name MJacobsonn will link the children with
one of the two families from which they are descended and that
"Hamby" will not.
The Respondent's contentions are puzzling. "Hamby" is the
children's mother's name. She is linked to her mother and father iyythe name^
respective laffshe uses. There is no evidence in the record that Ms.
Hamby's mother took Ms. Hamby's father's surname or that the name
Ms. Hamby bore before her first marriage was that of either her mother
or father. Presumably it was.
Any lawyer who has done a title search realizes that family descendants bear numerous surnames. Respondent's argument that children
should not use a surname not originally borne by either of its
parents is a policy argument. Even if the Utah Legislature were to
enact a children's names law, however, under the common law and the
4
Constitution of the United States, parents have the right to name
their children as they please. Limiting the names parents could give
their children would be patently unlawful. See cases cited, supra,
page 9£and Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
The standard of the "best interests of the child" does not by
definition allow for a limitation on the name which may be in a child's
best interests. Ms. Hamby wants her

children to bear the same name

as the rest of her household>including herself.

4
Amendment XIV, section 1
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Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein and in her Initial Brief, the
Appellant Kathleen Hamby asks that the Order and Ruling of the Fourth
Judicial District Court be reversed and her two children fathered by
her ex-husband be given her surname, Hamby. The Appellant also requests
that in its Order to such effect, the Supreme Court of Utah give clear
direction to trial courts of the state for a method for resolving
disputes between custodial and noncustodial parents of newborn, infant
or very young children consisten^with the custodial parent's authority
to direct the upbringing of children in accordance with their best interests.
Ms. Hamby asks that such an Order be made following oral argument
on the issues raised herein.
Dated this 22 day of August, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,

Priscilla Ruth
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

3

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4

6

KATHLEEN JACOBSON and STATE OF
UTAH, by and through Utah State
Department of Social Services,

7

Plaintiff,

5

8

vs.

9

GAIL JACOBSON,

Civil No. 67957
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL

Defendant.

10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled

12
13

matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable

14

J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on

15

the 14th day of March, 1985, commencing at the hour of 9:25

16

o'clock a.m., at Room 310, County Building, Provo, Utah;
That there appeared as counsel represen-

17
18

ting the Plaintiff Kathleen Jacobson, DONALD E. ELKINS, ESQ.,

19

and as counsel represending the Plaintiff State of Utah,

20

RAY E. GAMMON, ESQ., and that there appeared as counsel

21

representing the Defendant, RICHARD M. TAYLOR, ESQ.
WHEREFORE, the following proceedings

22
23

were had:

24

THE COURT:

25

EDWARD V. QUIST, CSR
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Jacobson.
MR. ELKINS:

I'm Don Elkins, on behalf

of the plaintiff.
THE COURT:
MR. ELKINS:

Ready to proceed?
Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed,
Mr. Taylor?
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Do you want to briefly tell

me what it's all about?
MR. ELKINS:

Your Honor, this is a

divorce matter and has turned into essentially a default
divorce, but there is one area of contention between the
two parties.

There is a stipulation now on file that dis-

poses of the property settlement, child custody, that type
of thing.

It's a little unusual in that the matter they are

disputing, I'm not sure there a definite statement anywhere
in Utah law of how the things to be decided.

That's the

reason we'd like the Court to listen to it.
What the dispute centers around is whether or not
one child that is the natural child of the plaintiff and the
defendant, although born before this marriage, and one other
child that's due to be born in about four weeks shall bear
the surname of the plaintiff or the defendant.

The child

that was born before the marriage now bears the surname of
#~3

p>
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the plaintiff and she wants that situation to continue with
the new child also.

The defendant, the father, wants both

Children to bear his last name.
The plaintiff would like the opportunity in
addition to stating her gounds for the divorce to explain
to the Court why she wants that name to be as it is now,
and why she wants the new child also to bear her name.
That's where we stand.
MR. TAYLOR:

May it please the Court:

The defendant is an unemployed miner who called
me about a week ago and indicated that he had a chance to
go out of state for a few days work and, therefore, it would
be inconvenient for him and difficult for him to be here at
this hearing.

I called Mr. Elkins and advised him of this,

told him that rather than delay the matter I would not file
an application for vacation of trial setting if the only
issue to be reserved would be the question of this name
change.

And Mr. Elkins indicated that was agreeable and

that if the Court, after hearing the plaintiff's representations, would not deny the motion, then Mr. Elkins agrees
that we may stipulate and join in the motion to the Court
that the case may be continued just to hear his response at
a time when he's available.

He's been unemployed all winter,

and told me that if he passed this opportunity up he'd go
to the bottom of the board, something to do with the union,
A-*
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and he was very upset about the difficult that this appearing
today and testifying would create for him.
So, that's our posture, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, he says that the law
provides for changing of a name.

Isn't there some law,

however, that provides what will and what will not be a
legal name of a person?
MR. TAYLOR:

The common law is that the

father who is, ordinarily, would object has a right to haVe
the name remain with him, his own name, have the children
bear his own name, unless there's an overriding benefit.
THE COURT:

Is that what the law is,

unless there's an overriding consideration?
MR. TAYLOR:

If there's a consideration

which would be -THE COURT:

Does it have to be public,

MR. TAYLOR:

Yes, it would have to be

or is it --

for the benefit of the children.
THE COURT:

Oh.

Well, I meant overriding

public considerations?
MR. TAYLOR:
sentence.

No.

I didn't finish my

If there's an overriding reason why it's for the

children's benefit, the name change can be made.

I can

conceive in a situation if someone had a notorious name, for
/>->

\

2 H

4

example -THE COURT: Well, you can do that by
simply following the procedure for a change of name.
MR. TAYLOR: Yes.
MR. ELKINS:

Your Honor, I might point

out here: There is no change of name, your Honor.

The one

child in existence has the name Hamby on the birth certificate, which she wants, which has been born.

The new child

has no name. We are arguing about whether the new child
here has to be named Jacobson and whether that new child
should have that name based on the birth certificate.

We

have a letter from the State of Utah, in fact, it says the
name on the birth certificate should be the name both parents
agree upon, which would tend to show that there isn't a
definite way one way or another of what the name would be,
it's just that the two parties should agree on what name
they place on that certificate.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, why don't we

get the evidence in and then if you want to move for a
continuance or something, we'll take that up at the time.
MR. TAYLOR:
would be, your Honor:

My point, my procedure

If at the conclusion of her evidence

the Court is unwilling to rule at that time that she is not
entitled to what she would ask for, then we would ask for a
continuance to allow him to present his view.
fl~(s
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THE COURT: All right.
MR. ELKINS: All right.

You may proceed.
Thank you.

Mrs. Jacobson, would you stand here and be sworn?
KATHLEEN JACOBSON, having been called as
a witness, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ELKINS:
Q

Mrs. Jacobson, could you please state your full

name and address, for the record?
A

Yes. My name's Kathy Jacobson.

I live at 45 East

100 -- 200 South, in Goshen.
Q

And are you the plaintiff in this matter that's

before the Court this morning?
A

Yes.

Q

And when were you married to Mr. Jacobson, the

defendant?
A

November 29th of '83.

Q

And Mrs. Jacobson, were you a resident of Utah

County for more than three months prior to the time that this
Complaint was filed?
A

Thirteen years.

Q

Your Complaint states that your husband treated

you cruelly, causing you great mental distress.
tell the Court what you mean by that?

Could you

What did your husband

do that made you want the divorce?
$,n

,iu
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A

Well, he's verbally abusive, he's physically

abusive, and he's abusive to all of the children in our home.
He's <a. drunk. He's drunk more often than he's sober. And
he wouldn't work.
Q

Were these continuing problems throughout the time

that :you were married to Mr. Jacobson?
A

Yes, they were.

Q

All right.

And when did you and Mr. Jacobson

separate?
A

October 20th.

Q

Of 1984?

A

Urn-hum.

Q

You told me that you want to resume use of your

(Yes)

prior married name, Hamby; is that correct?
A

Yes , it is.

Q

Do you have any children that now have that name?

A

Yes, I do.

I have a ten-year-old son from my first

marriage whose name is Hamby, and I have a 21-month-old son
whose name is Hamby.
THE COURT:

How did he get the name of

Hamby ?
THE WITNESS:

He was born out of wedlock,

and I gave him the name that I carried then.
Q

(By Mr. Elkins) At the time that that child was

born, did you have plans to marry Mr. Jacobson?

A-r \*
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1

A

No, I didn't.

2

Q

After you were married did you ever discuss with

3

Mr. Jacobson the matter of changing the name of that child

4

from Hamby to Jacobson?

5

A

6

was one of the ideas to marry was to give this baby a home

7

and stable family conditions.

8

never even brought up till about June he said I should send

9

for the papers. When I got them I filled them out and told

When we were talking about getting married, that

After we were married it was

10

him that all that

needed to be done was have them notorized

11

and that I'd leave that up to him when he wanted to do it,

12

and he never did until, I think it was the 2nd of October

13

when he demanded that we sign it, which at the time I already

14

had told him I was leaving him.

15

have some kind of a foothold.

16

child's sake it was the thing to do and I went ahead and

17

signed them, but I didn't send them into the State because

18

I was too confused as to whether I should give him that kind

19

of a right to a child that he had been abusive towards, and

20

he's hurt that baby.

21

The baby's lost the upward motion in his left eye.

22

Q

23

that?

24

A

25

had two specialists look at him.

And I think he did that to

But I still felt that for my

He's hit him in the head with a board.

Has the baby received medical treatment because of

Yes, he has. There's no treatment, though.

A 7
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He's

8

Q

Mrs. Hamby, on file in this matter is a document

called a Stipulation -- excuse me -- Mrs. Jacobson, that
you and the defendant Gail Jacobson both executed along with
your attorneys.

Did you enter into that of your own free

will?
A

Yes.

Q

It seems that Stipulation takes care of most of

the matters that the divorce hearing ordinarily would take
care of, but paragraph 10 bring up the question of the name
of the children.

Can you explain to me why you donft want

the child that you currently have with Mr. Jacobson and the
child that's to be born to have Mr. Jacobsonfs name?
A

Yes, I could.
THE COURT:

answers that question:

There's no -- Before she

I don't know that I can do anything

about the child of the parties born, can I, in this proceeding?
MR. ELKINS:
Honor.

I don't think you can, your

I think that if Mr. Jacobson wanted to change the

name from Hamby, he would have to -MR. TAYLOR:
to be heard on that.

Your Honor, I would like

I didn't respond when your Honor

~

THE COURT: Well, you can be heard on
the question of what can I do with regard to the child that's
already been born.
#~/o
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MR. TAYLOR:

Do you want me to speak

THE COURT;

Yes, in this proceeding.

to that now?
I

know what I can do in an appropriate application for a name
change.
MR. TAYLOR:

The child which has already

been born, your Honor, is the child of the defendant.
THE COURT:

Well, but this is an action

for divorce.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Okay.

Now, it's not an

action to change names; and a child already in existence is,
the law provides, common law or otherwise, and the parties
have done whatever they have done -MR. TAYLOR:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

-- with respect to names.

MR. TAYLOR:

They have married and in

effect legitimized the child.
THE COURT:
question before me?

Yes.

But do I have that

It's foreign to this divorce decree,

isn't it?
MR. TAYLOR:

The child before the Court,

because the support for the child before the Court and the
legitimacy of the child, I think the child has been legitimized by the parents and by acknowledgment of both parties,
h-il
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that the child is, at the child's age, in that event it's
just as if the child was born and conceived after wedlock.
So if she chooses to call the child Hamby, I don't think
that that would preclude the Court from ordering at this
time that this is common law right to have the child to bear
his name if he's going to be ordered to support and be
determined to be the father of the child, thereby compromized -MR. ELKINS:

Your Honor, we do have an

exhibit that may be placed here in the record here that may
help the Court decide, at least what

the policy of the

State of Utah would be towards that.
THE COURT:

She may - - A s the question

that you asked her.
Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

Mrs. Hamby, can you tell me why

you don't want Mr. Jacobson's name attached to the child
that's already been born to the two of you and the child
that's going to be born to you?
A

Yes.

I have a lot of reasons.

for, are for the benefit of the children.

The main one is
If the children

don't have the same last name in the family I feel that it
makes more insecurity, less family closeness.

Mr. Jacobson

has put me in a position now to raise three children by
myself, because it's his choice not to be a husband that
I can stay with.

And when I have to raise three children
/4-/^
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I need the best circumstances to raise those kids under that'q
possible; and I feel that having my whole family have the
same last name brings the family closer together, there will
be a lot less questions brought up at an earlier date for
those little babies.

They won't be wondering why their

name is different until they are old enough to discuss it,
I'd also like to tell you that where I hadn't sent
the paper in and even put Mr. Jacobson on Kelly's birth
certificate, I've agreed to do that, I've agreed to put his
name on the birth certificate of the born child and have the
unborn child when it's born.
THE COURT:

When are you expecting this

child to be born that you are carrying?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Within four weeks.

Okay.

THE WITNESS:

And I feel that they should

have their father's name on the birth certificate.

That's

for the children's sake.
Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

You are speaking of, as the father

of the child?
A

As the father stated in the place where it says

"father," to say that Gail Jacobson is the father, so that
the children see a father there on their birth certificate.
And I feel that that's a moral decision that I've already
made, but the last name is what -A-/J
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Q

Mrs. Jacobson, let me interrupt.

Have you sought

any professional advise on any affect of the children having
different names?
A

Yes, I have.

I have Mr. Downey here today, who is

a school psychologist.

I've talked to a lot of people about

it.

I was, also, raised in a broken home with a different

last name and saw the affects of it.

Even when you are

happy in a broken home, when you come home with a child as
a friend and you introduce your mother with a different name,
your friend asks you: why does your mother have a different
name, is she really your mother, or things like that.

And,

so that kids begin to wonder who their mother and father is.
And I feel that it's just the security on the children.

It's

not an issue here I'm here to argue about to hurt Gail
Jacobson or anything else.

His name does carry around a

stigma.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:
A

We object to that, your Honoij
Her testimony may remain.

It's just that he, we live in a small town, a very

small town, his home and my home are two blocks apart, and
he has always been known as a drinker and a fighter in town.
His mother told me that when I tried to tell her and -Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

Well, you can't testify as to

what someone told you.
Q

Oh, okay.
r}'/</
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Q

Do you have personal knowledge of this reputation

you are speaking of Mr, Jacobson?
A

Yes, I do.

Q

How do you have that personal knowledge?

A

I've lived in that town for six years.

Q

Have you ever heard of anyone, without naming

names or specific conversations, say the types of things
about Mr. Jacobson that you have just portrayed to the Court?
MR. TAYLOR:

We'd object to this, your

Honor, as calling for hearsay.
THE COURT: Well, I guess she can testify
about reputation from her own knowledge, and it would have
to be based on what she's heard.
A

Yes.

I have heard a lot of people say things. And

mostly they said them after I left him.
Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

All right.

A

I knew that he had been married just prior to

being married to me, and another woman had to divorce him
within a year of marriage.

And she was pregnant, too.

THE COURT:
MR. ELKINS:
Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

That may go out.
That may be stricken.

Now, Mrs. Jacobson, as to the

remaining portions of the stipulation that you have entered
into are you willing to abide by the amounts that are contained in there as to property settlement and child support

A-IS
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and that type of thing?
A

Yes, I am.

Q

The stipulation calls for eighty dollars per month

per child child support.

Can you tell us what that was

based upon?
A

That was based on the fact that I need to get this

settled and over with.
Q

But to your knowledge was Mr. Jacobson employed at

the time that you entered into this?
A

Yes. Mr. Jacobson will be employed as long as he

chooses to be.
Q

Mrs. Jacobson, you told me that one item in the

stipulation that calls for you to return to Mr. Jacobson
certain bedroom drapes and two old knives which were his
property.
A

Have you been able to locate those items as yet?
There's some old drapes and curtain rods, but I

don't know of anything about the knives.
Q

If you can locate the knives are you willing to

return those at the earliest possible time?
A

Oh, sure.

Q

Have you moved -- You've moved recently from the

house that you occupied with Mr. Jacobson?
A

October 20th.

Q

So was any -- Have you unpacked everything in your

new location?

fr-lfv
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A

Well, I hadn't--It was in my basement, but my

basement flooded Thursday, so I'm in the process of dragging
things around and trying to find them.
I'll find them and return them.

If they are there,

But I don't believe that I

do even have them.
Q

Mrs. Jacobson, do you have any request to make

to the Court with regard to the three-month interlocutory
period that's called for by Utah law after this divorce is
granted?
A

Yes, I certainly do.

I'm going to have this child,

and I'm begging the Court to make the divorce final today
so that I can have this baby.

I've suffered this pregnancy

the whole time facing this divorce, and his family has given
me a bad time in town. And I feel that the sooner that the
divorce is made final, the sooner they'll leave me alone.
I'd like to be able to nurse my baby and settle down and
have a few weeks peace of mind before the baby gets here
without this hanging over us.
MR. ELKINS: And, your Honor, on file
in this matter is the letter from Mrs. Jacobson's doctor
that's indicated that because of some difficulty that she
has had with the pregnancy, that he recommends that it be
gotten over as quickly as possible.
MR. TAYLOR;

We have no objection.

MR. ELKINS:

I would like the Court to

H in
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take note of that.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ELKINS:

Could I have this marked

as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1?
THE COURT: With respect to the child
that is already born, do you say that child is 21 months
old?
THE WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And what's the child's name
on the birth certificate?
THE WITNESS:

On his birth certificate,

Kelly Lynn Hamby.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ELKINS:

Your Honor, we have that

birth certificate, if the Court would like to see it.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Just a minute.

THE WITNESS:
MR. ELKINS:
the birth certificate of Kelly.
THE COURT:
Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

Your Honor, I also feel —

Oh, okay.
Your Honor, if I might,
(handing to the Court)

Okay.

Mrs. Hamby, I have a letter here

that I have had marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.

It's

a letterhead from the State of Utah Department of Health and
addressed to Kathy Jacobson, Goshen, Utah.

ft-it
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tell me that and tell me if you recognize it?
A

Yes.

It's a letter, when I first separated, when

I was trying to find out what I was to do, to find out if
I didn't put Mr. Jacobson's name on the birth certificate
at all, if Kelly could still have social security benefits
if anything happened to Mr. Jacobson.

And they sent this

plus a booklet of the laws in the different states. And it
states that as long as we were married -Q

That's right, Mrs. Jacobson, the letter will

explain.
A

Okay.

Q

But does the letter at least explain to you what

the policy for the State of Utah is with regard to having
the name for Kelly changed?
A

Yes, it does.

Q

Okay.

There's no need.

MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, we'd like to
introduce Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 into evidence.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Well, we want to -I think I'm going to read it,

anyway.
MR. TAYLOR:

I think it's immaterial,

your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ELKINS:

fl-il
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have for Mrs. Jacobson at this time.
THE COURT:

All right.

You may step

down.
MR. TAYLOR:

May I cross examine, your

Honor?
THE COURT:

Oh, excuse me.

Certainly,

you may.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. TAYLOR:
Q

Mrs. Jacobson, Gail Jacobson is the father of

the child which is now born, is he not?
A

Yes.

Q

No question about that in your mind?

A

No.

Q

And you are anxious that the child receive all the

benefits of that fatherhood, are you not, that is, social
security in the event Mr. Jacobson should die, all of the
benefits which may be available by reason of any federal
entitlement through Social Security?

Is that not correct?

A

I don't know anything about the federal.

Q

Well, I'm talking about just social security.

If

Gail should die you'd want your son to receive that benefit,
wouldn't you?
A

Yes, I would.

Q

And also there are other benefits that the child
A-M>
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may receive by having some attention of it's father, is
that not true, such as whatever association or fcomfort the
child may have?
I donft feel there's anything like that.

A

No, sir.

Q

So you don't want Gail to have any association

with the child at all?
A

He hasn't had any these months I have been gone.

Q

All right.

Now, but you don't want him to have

any in the future; is that what you are saying to the Coutt?
A

I'm hoping he doesn't.

Q

You don't want Gail to visit with the child or

have any association with him?
A

I'm hoping he doesn't.

Q

And yet you want him to support the child and be

a father to him for all of the benefits that may give to
the child, but you don't want any of the benefits to come to
the child by any association with Gail.
A

Is that right?

I would love him to have benefits by association,

if there are any present.

There aren't any.

Q

You've made this decision forever and ever?

A

No, I haven't.

And as far as the name goes, I

still like, as the children are babies, they should have
the same family name.

And where he is on the birth certifi-

cate and will be put on Kelly's birth certificate, which
I've agreed to as the children get older, if they make the

/?-£/
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decision that they want their father's name, if he has been
coming around and seeing them and being a father to them, I
would never object to my children having their way when they
are old enough to make a decision like that,
Q

But you want to make that decision for them now?

A

Yes, I do.

I have custody of them, and I'm their

mother.
MR. TAYLOR:

That's all, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, now, you may step
down.

Thank you.
THE WITNESS:

Thank you.

MR. ELKINS: Your Honor, we have one
other witness that we would like to call, the Nebo School
psychologist that Mrs. Jacobson has consulted about the
affect of the children having different names; that he has
some interesting things that he might say that relate to
this case.

If we could ask him a few questions, we'd

appreciate it.
THE COU&T:

I don't know whether I'm

going to let that become an issue or not.
MR. TAYLOR:

I have some law on the matteif

your Honor, I'd like to be heard and at the appropriate time
THE COURT:

Do you have an objection to

this witness testifying?
MR. TAYLOR:
/J'J*
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THE COURT:
MR. ELKINS:

Okay, call him.
Mr. Downey, will you come

forward.
GAYLON L. DOWNEY, having been called as
a witness, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ELKINS:
Q

Would you please state your full name and address,

for the record?
A

My name is Gaylon Lester Downing.

I live at

1627 South 400 West, in Orem.
Q

And, Mr. Downing, where are you employed, currently^

A

Ifm employed in Payson, Utah for Nebo School

District.
Q

What is your job there?

A

I'm a school psychologist.

Q

How long have you had that job?

A

This is my eighth year.

Q

And, Mr. Downing, could you please tell the Court

about your educational background, where you went to school?
A

I went to BYU, got my bachelors and masters at

BYU, bachelors in psychology and masters in psychology.
Q

And when did you graduate with your masters?

A

1977.

Q

Mr. Downing, could you please tell the Court just
ft JJ
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what your job with Nebo School District entails?
A

I do testing and evaluations for children in

special education programs, resource class as well as consulting with parents, teachers, principals, counseling with
students or in group therapy sessions, group counseling,
that type of thing.
Q

Mr. Downing, you have been present throughout the

course of this proceeding this morning so far. Has you had
occasion prior to this day to talk with Mrs. Jacobson about
this case?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

Are you familiar with the details of this parti-

cular matter?
A

Yes.

THE COURT: Have you talked with Mr.
Jacobson?

THE WITNESS :

Not recently, no.

THE COURT: Have you ever?
THE WITNESS :

Yes, I have.

THE COURT: How long ago?
THE WITNESS :

This has probably been

three years since I 've met with him.

THE COURT: Okay.

It wouldn't have had

anything to do with either of these children?

THE WITNESS :

flat
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children.
THE COURT:
Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

I see.

Okay.

You've heard, I hope, what we

have been talking about with regard to names and children.
Do you have any background at all in the problem of whether
or not children from a divorce should have the parents,
either father or the mother's, name?
A

Professional experience in working with kids

that I've counseled with who are going through divorces of
whose parents have gone through divorces, and they have been
in that kind of situation where they have been placed in
chosing a name or deciding which name they'd like to have for
themselves; and sometimes you can change in that type of
personal involvement, yes.
Q

Perhaps that question wasn't as direct as I -- If

I can rephrase it and see what I'm getting at here:

Do you

have any experience with cases where children within a
family have had different last names?
A

Yes, I have.

Q

Do you have any opinions about the affects of that

situation?
A

Yes. Where they come from a family that has two

different names, it disrupts somewhat the identity they
have with themselves and also with the family.

A big part

of what a child feels himself to be is linked to the immediate!
fi
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family they are involved with.

And when a child can say

well, we are the foundation or we are this family, it helps
provide, essentially, unity in the family and something they
belong to. Where if there's two names, it provides some
kind of division in that unity that they are faced with
whenever they fill out an application and whenever they
state their name in class.

That kind of thing raises a

lot of questions continuing in their minds.

And in a refer-

ence with the unity that's involved in a family, that
provides a lot of security for a child that is growing up.
Q

In your opinion as one who works in the area of

child psychology, from what you know about this particular
case, if after this divorce Mrs. Jacobson were to have one
name and one or two of her children were to have a different
name, could you foresee any possible problems that might
result fro the children?
MR. TAYLOR:
Honor.

We object to that, your

I don't think they have a proper foundation for him

to give a conclusion on this particular case.

I think he

can speak generally, but he's never talked with the father
or -THE COURT:

I think that might be true.

I think he may talk in general terms.
Q

(By Mr. Elkins)

Generally, in a case it would be

similar, if there was a divorce and the mother were to have

// ^
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one name and one or more of the children could have another
name, do you see any problems that might develop?
A

Possibly, yes.

It's never a sure thing because

there are so many factors involved.

But that could be a

factor, it could hinder a child in their development.
Q

Can you give me an example of what type of problem

might develop?
A

For example, I've worked with one boy whose parents

are divorced, and he will go through periods when he's more
happy with his dad so he'll take on his dad's name, and
there will be some problems there, and so he'll go move in
with his mom and he'll take his mom's name.

And it will

create uncertainty in his own mind as to who he is and where
he is and what he ought to be doing.

Because attached to

that name is also the values that go along with the parent
who also has that name.
MR. ELKINS:

Thank you, Mr. Downey.

That's all I have.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. TAYLOR:
Q

You are certainly not advocating in all circum-

stances that the name of the father be changed to that of
the mother in case of a divorce, are you?
A

I think it should always be considered on an

individual basis.
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Q

And in this particular case you really can't say

what Mr, Jacobson1s behavior would be later or whether even
it's bad now, you don't know that, do you?
A

I can't say for sure what his behavoir has been.

Q

In fact you deal with a great many children in

families where there are divorces and where the children
bear two different names?
A

Yes.

Q

And in many of those cases the children are getting

along well, is that not true?
A

That's true.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

That's all.
All right, you may step down.

MR. ELKINS:

That's all the plaintiff

THE COURT:

You say you have some law.

has, your Honor.

Tell me what it is.
MR. TAYLOR:

Yes.

I don't have anything

in Utah, but American Juris Prudence 57 Am Jur 2d at Section
4 page 284 is to the effect that it's generally recognized
that the father who is ordinarily the objecting party has a
protectable interest in having his child bear the paternal
surname in accordance with the usual custom, even though the
mother may have been awarded the custody of the child; and
for that reason the name, merely to save the mother or the
A<W
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child from inconvenience or embarrassment, won't be authoriz
ed against the father's objection.
Now, as I've stated earlier, where there's a substantial interest and in changing the name and where there's
a good reason for the benefit of the children, then I think
the Court does have the power to order it under the common
law.

Now, there are a number of cases cited in the anno-

tations, and all of them seem to support, I couldn't find
any of the cases where they authorized a change of name,
they all have denied it.

That doesn't mean to say that

in a proper circumstance or a proper showing a name change
would be granted.
THE COURT:
MR. TAYLOR:

Okay.
But that's all I have to

say on it.
THE COURT:
this matter -- Oh, excuse me.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COU&T:
MR. TAYLOR:

Now, where do you sit in
Did you have something more?
Yes, I do, your Honor.
Go ahead, then.
I'd like to point out that

I think that the Court's power and responsibility is the same
with respect to the child which was born out of wedlock but
which has been acknowledged and accepted into the family as
though that child were born in wedlock, and that there's no
real difference.

And the mere fact that this lady chose to

A
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put the name Hamby on the birth certificate should not preclude the Court from requiring that if this man is going to
be ordered to support the child, acknowledge paternity,
accept the responsibility for the child, be given the right
to visitation and all of the normal things that the father
has, that merely because the child was born prior to wedlock
should not preclude the Court from ordering that that child
bear this man's surname, because he's going to have all of
the burden of responsibility.
THE COURT:

All right.

Where do you sit

in the matter?
MR. GAMMON:

The mother has received

some assitance from the State of Utah in the past.

The

defendant or father has paid that money to the State that was
owing to the State.

And so the State then is simply to

state that we have been paid for all assistance that has been
provided heretofore.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

This is

what I'm going to do:
First of all, we'll grant the plaintiff a decree
of divorce from and against the defendant on the grounds of
cruelty; and the divorce will become absolute upon its signing and entry in the register of actions of the Clerk. And
it will be based upon the stipulation, that is the relief
that the agreement, stipulation of the parties, have entered
fV3C
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into is approved, and that may be incorporated in the decree.
MR. ELKINS:

Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ELKINS: Mr. Taylor has agreed with
me that we might add a mutual restraining order to that
stipulation, also.
MR. TAYLOR:

We have no objection, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right, and that may go

in, too.
Now, with respect to the name of the child that's
here previously born, the, is it Kelly?
MR. ELKINS:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
His name on the official

records of the State of Utah is, and the record will show
that the birth certificate has been exhibited to me, is
Kelly Lynn Hamby.

And I will permit a filing in this action,

if you care to file it, an application for name change; and
the issue can be raised, joined, at that time.

If nothing

is done with respect to it, there's no further court order;
the child's name will be as it is upon the records of the Statje
of Utah at this time, on the birth certificate.
Now, with respect to the child who is to be born,
that, the name of that child will also be Jacobson, Jacobson,
unless there is a petition or application for name change
/' J/
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filed in this case. And Ifm doing that solely to keep filing
costs down.

I would normally require it in a separate suit.

But I'll consider it as though it were filed as an application for name change under the statute.

In other words,

I believe that there's something, first of all, I think Kelly
has the legal name and it would have to be changed and should
be changed upon the records, under the law, if that's what
should be done.

And the child to be born would have the,

under the common law, would normally be known as Jacobsoni
But after birth of that child you can file a petition or an
application in this case, then I'll consider it as an application for -MR. TAYLOR:

The Court didn't indicate

any time limit on this. We would prefer to wait until the
birth of the new child and have it all handled at once, if
that's a -THE COURT:

You can do that, and we'll

give you 30 days after the child is born.
MR. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

Thirty days after the birth.
In which to file any appli-

cation for name change.
Now, you'd have the same right, Mr. Elkins, because J
and then I can give consideration to the testimony of this
witness and also her testimony with regard to reasons and so
on, and then we'll decide that name change at that time.
t)'3Z
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MR. TAYLOR:

And I presume we would

have opportunity then to present testimony.
THE COURT:

Exactly.

But the legal

names of the child will be, against the advise of a professional, would be Hamby and Jacobson at this juncture.

How-

ever, the second child has not been born yet, the one we are
talking about.

And so we'll preserve the issues with respect

to both until that time.
MR. ELKINS:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Okay.

But the decree of

divorce, as I indicated, will be final upon entry.

The

names will be the only thing that would be reserved for
further consideration.
(WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded at 10:02
o'clock a.m.)
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Governor
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June 16, 1986

Pricilla MacDougall
346 Kent Lane
Madison, Wisconsin 53713
Oear Ms. MacDougal:
This is in response to your telephone request
guidelines for naming father and surname of child.

for a

copy

of our

A copy of the guidelines are enclosed, along with a copy of Rule 1.5 and
Rule 3.4 of our proposed revised Rules (formerly Regulations) for Vital
Statistics in Utah. I believe that with these revised Rules we will be able
to discard our guidelines.
If you have any suggestions, please let me know.
Sincere!

John E. Brockert, Director
Bureau of Health Statistics
(801) 538-6186

Enclosure

Office of Management Planning
288 North 1460 West • PO Box 16700 • Salt Lake Oty Utah 84116-0700 • (801) 538-6186
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Rule 1.4

Designation of Additional Offices

Full-time local health officers may be designated by the Department to serve
as the local registrar of vital statistics for the area they serve as
healthofficer. They shall carry out their required duties without payment of
any additional fee. For areas of the state not served by a full-time local
health officer, the Department, acting through the State Registrar, shall
designate an individual to serve as local registrar.
The State Registrar shall delegate such duties and responsibilities for the
local registrars as he deems necessary to insure the efficient operation of
the system of vital statistics. Ihese may include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(a)

The receipt and processing of birth, death, and spontaneous fetal
death records. This includes the receipt of these records from the
person responsible for filing the record, checking it for accuracy
and completeness, making a local copy, and forwarding the original
to the State Registrar at least once a week.

(b)

Issuance of certified copies of birth, death, and fetal death
certificates after receiving written authorization from the State
Registrar. The records from which the certified copies are issued
shall be the local copy of the original certificate. All forms and
procedures used to issue the copies shall be provided or approved
by the State Registrar.

(c)

Issuance of burial-transit and disinterment permits and other
designated forms as prescribed by regulation or direction of the
State Registrar.

(d)

Acting as the agent of the State Registrar in their designated area
and
providing
assistance
to
physicians, hospitals,
funeral
directors, and others in matters related to the system of vital
statistics.

The State Registrar, with the approval of the Department, shall determine the
responsibilities and duties of each office independently.
Iftle 1.5

Name of Child

Hie child's name should be determined by its1 parents.
If the parents
<$sagree on the child's name and they have never married each other or are
separated or divorced, the custodial parent shall determine the child's name.
t| the parents are married to each other and cannot agree on the child's name,
ft may be left blank and added later by an Affidavit to Amend a Record or by
court order.
RULE 2.

Infants
26-2-6)

of

Unknown

Parentage;

Ihe report for an infant of unknown
foundling certificate of live birth
information is available:

Registration

parentage shall be
and shall, unless

- 3 -
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Foundling

(Section

registered on a
more definitive

Amendments shall be filed with and become part of the record to which it
pertains.
The original certificate shall be marked "Amended, 1 of 2," or
however many parts the amendment may require. Subsequent parts will be marked
accordingly.
When an amendment is accepted, the State Registrar shall transmit copies of
the amendment to the local registrar in whose office a copy of the original
record is on file.
Rule 3.3

Amendment of Medical and Health Data

Whenever the originally furnished medical and health data of any record of
death, fetal death, or live birth is modified by supplemental information, the
certifying physician or medical examiner having knowledge of this information,
may certify, under penalty of perjury, the changes necessary to make the
information correct and file it with the state or local registrar. The cause
of death information may also be amended by the physician who performs an
autopsy on the deceased.
This amendment shall be processed in the manner prescribed in Section 3.2 of
these rules.
Ilftfte 3.4

Acknowledgement of Paternity by Natural Parents

A thild born to an unmarried mother may not have the father's name entered on
tt# birth certificate unless the mother and father sign an acknowledgement of
paternity. If the acknowledgement of paternity is signed and received before
tie certificate is registered, the father's name and other related information
4py be entered in the appropriate items on the original certificate. The
ffknowledgement of paternity is transmitted with the original certificate to
|§e State Registrar, where it is retained as documentary evidence.
4Un acknowledgement of paternity received after the certificate is registered
|s not acceptable for registration. Alternatively, the father's information
|tay be added by amendment as specified in Rule 3.2. However, if another man
is
shown as the father of the child on the original certificate, the
Correction can only be made following a judicial determination of paternity or
following adoption.
RULE 4

Delayed Registration of Birth (Section 26-2-8)

Rule 4.1

Registration - Ten Days to One Year

Certificates of birth filed after ten days, but within one year from the date
of birth, shall be registered on the standard birth certificate in the manner
prescribed in Section 26-2-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
Such
certificate shall not be marked "Delayed."
The State Registrar may require additional evidence in support of the facts of
birth and/or an explanation of why the birth certificate was not filed within
the required ten days.

- 5 -
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March 5, 19 79

Lesley DuVall
Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee
State of Indiana
State House
Indianapolis, Indiana
Re: Senate Bill No. 81Statutory change of minors'
names
Dear Senator DuVall:
Thank you for inviting my comments on Senate Bill No. 81 respecting the statutory changing of minors1 names. As I understand from our conversation, that portion of the bill relating
to the statutory changing of adults' names was deleted and I am
therefore addressing my comments to that portion of the bill relating to children's names only.
As I mentioned to you on the telephone, there are several
problems with the bill as drafted in light of the mandate for
equal protection for women and the recognition of children's
legal rights and privileges. There are several issues I could
discuss, some of which I mentioned to you briefly, but the most
obvious problem I see with the bill is that it appears to be
patently designed to prevent women with children in their custody
from statutorily changing their children's names if the father
objects and contributes any support for the child and is in obeyance with a decree issued pursuant to IC 31-1-11'. 5.
While this discrimination is phrased as a presumption, it
appears, though "neutrally" worded,to clearly be written to give
men the predominant naming rights of children.
Do you mean the bill to app^y to the statutory changing of
only the names of children born to married parents?
The presumption is not only discriminatory, but runs contrary
to the general presumption in favor of a custodial parent who
is ordinarily entrusted with the "care and control" of a minor.
A sex neutral statute could give any presumption to the custodial
parent while still leaving the noncustodial parent the right to
petition for a statutory name change of his/her minor child. Unless the custodial parent could be deprived of the control of
his/her child in another area (for example, in changing the school
or religion of the child), s/he should not be deprived of the
control of the child's name, subject, of course, to the overriding
standard of the child's best interests and the child's.own rights.

A-3y

Ind.-p.2
The bill docs mention the child's best interests as controlling
the statutory name change of a minor, but does not provide for
independent representation for the child to protect those interests
or the child's independent rights. In practice the male judiciary
has recited the "best interests of the child" as the appropriate
standard for reviewing name changes where the parents disagree,
but then has decided cases in such a way as to almost always favor
the father over the mother. To avoid this, perhaps the bill
could provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the
child in cases where the parents disagree. I have seen guardians
ad litem used well in cases of disagreement between parents in
naming their children both after divorces and at births.
To provide that the child's rights are preserved, the bill could:
1) specifically recoqnize the child's preferences as a presumption
equal to that of the custodial parent's at least after the age of
10 or 12, and 2) require the consent of the child at a specific
age, perhaps 14, the age recognized in some states as that at
which a minor can change his/her name statutorily in his/her own
right.
I shall be happy to comment further and to work with you or
any staff working on the bill in drafting a provision which is
not sex discriminatory and which protects minors' rights and
privileges.

Sincerely,
Priscilla Ruth MadQougall
Judith Palmer, Executive Assistant to the Governor
Richard C. Bodine, Representative
Patrick Carroll, Senator
John Donaldson, Chair, House Committee on the Judiciary
Lynn Brundage, Indiana Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project
ACLU, Women's Rights Project
National Organization For Women
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January 22, 1979
PRINTING CODE—The parts in this style type are additions to the text of the existing section of the law. The
parts in thio otyle type are deletions from the text of
the existing section of the law. The absence of either
of the above type styles in BT amendatory SECTION
indicates that an entirely new section or chapter is to
be added to the existing law.

DIGEST
Adds IC 34-4-6-1.1 to require parental consent to change
the name oi a minor child; to change the procedure for a
name change by requiring the reason for the change to be
stated in the petition to the court, notice to be given seven
days after the filing of the petition, specified information to
be contained in the petition, and a hearing to determine
whether the petition should be granted. Adds IC 34-4-6-2.1
to require a hearing on any objections to the petition."
Repeals IC 34-4-6-1, IC 34-4-6-2, IC 34-4-6-3, and IC 34-4-64, which are the current change of name provisions.

SENATE BILL No. 81
A BILL FOR AN ACT to amend IC 34-4-6 concerning the
procedure for changing an individual's name.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Indiana:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SECTION 1. IC 34-4-6 is amended by adding a NEW section 1.1 to read as follows; Sec. 1.1. (a) An individual who
wishes to change his name, or the name of his minor child,
must present a verified petition stating in detail the reason
the change is requested to the circuit court located in his
county of residence.
(b) Not more than seven (7) days from the date the petition is filed, the petitioner must publish notice of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the county of
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2

1
2
3
4
5
6
/
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

the petitioner's residence. Notice must be given once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks. If a newspaper of general
publication is not published in the petitioner's county of residence, then the notice must be published ir * newspaper of
general publication in an adjoining county.
(c) The notice required by subsection (b) must include:
(1 The name of the petitioner.
(2) The name of the person whose name is to be changed
(if different from that of the petitioner).
1.3} The new name desired.
(4) The name of the court in which the action is pending
(5) The date on which the petition was filed.
(6) A statement of the rights of any person to appear at
the hearing and to file objections.
(d) Proof of publication must be made by filing a copy of
the published notice, verincd by a disinterested party, with
the court.
e Except as provided by IC 31-3-1-6, if the petition is to
change the name of a minor child, the written consent of the
parents, or the written consent of the child's guardian if both
parents are dead, must be filed with the petition.
(f) Before a minor child's name may be changed, the par
ents or guardian of the child must be served with a copy of
the petition as required by the Indiana trial rules.
SECTION 2. IC 344-6 is amended by adding a NEW section 2.1 to read as follows: Sec. 2.1. (a) Except as provided
under subsection (b), the court may hear the petition and
issue a final decree after thirty (30) days from the later of:
(1) the filing of proof of publication of the notice required
under section 1.1 of this chapter; or
(2) the service of the petition upon the parents or guardian, or both, of a minor child.
(b) The court shall set a date for a hearing on the petition
if:
(1) written objections have been filed; or
(2) a parent or guardian of a minor child has refused or
failed to give written consent under section l.Ke: ;•* this
chapter.
The court shall require that appropriate notice of the hearing be given to the parent or guardian of the minor child or
to any person who has filed written objections. In deciding
on the petition to change the name of a minor child, the
court shall be guided by the best interest of the child rule
under IC 31-1-11.5-21. However, there is a presumption in
favor of a parent of a minor child who:

rt~9/

3

1
2
3
4
5
6

li) has been making support payments and fulfilling
other duties in accordance with a decree issued under IC 311-11.5; and
(ii) objects to the proposed name change of the child.
SECTION 3. IC 34-4-5-1, IC 34-4-6-2, IC 34-4-6-3, and IC
34-4-6-4 are repealed.

COMMITTEE REPORT
Mr. President: Your Committee on Judiciary which was
referred Senate Bill No. 81, has had the same under consideration and begs leave to report the same back to the Senate
with the recommendation that said bill be amended as follows:
Page 2, line 12, delete "interested party" and insert in
roman "person".
Page 2, delete line 25 and insert in roman the following:
"SECTION 2. IC 34-4-6 is amended by adding a NEW section 2.1 to read as follows: Sec. 2.1. (a) Except as provided
under subsection (b), the court may hear the petition and
issue a final decree after thirty (30) days from the later of:
(1) the filing of proof of publication of the notice required
under section 1.1 of this chapter; or
(2) the service of the petition upon the parents or guardian, or both, of a minor child.
(b) The court shall set a date for a hearing on the petition
if:
(1) written objections have been filed; or
(2) a parent or guardian of a minor child has refused or
failed to give written consent under section 1.1(e) of this
chapter.
The court shall require that appropriate notice of the hearing be given to the parent or guardian of the minor child or
to any person who has filed written objections. In deciding
on the petition to change the name of a minor child, the
court shall be guided by the best interest of the child rule
under IC 31-1-11.5-21. However, there is a presumptior in
favor of a parent of a minor child who:
(i) has been making support payments and fulfilling
other duties in accordance with a decree issued under IC 311-11.5; and

/'-#-?

4
(ii) objects to the proposed name change of the child.".
Page 2, delete lines 26, 27 and 28.
Page 3, delete lines 1-11, inclusive.
(Reference is made to bill as introduced)
and when so amended that said bill do pass.
DUVALL, Chairman
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STATE OP MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C7-86-283
Crippen, Judge

Aitkin County

John R. Leitner
Aitkin County Attorney
Anne L. Mohaupt
Assistant County Attorney
Courthouse Annex
Aitkin, MN 56431

Aitkin County Family Service
Agency and Charlene DeVonne
Evelyn Hoglund,
Appellants,
vs.

Richard A* Zimmerman
P. 0. Box 388
Aitkin, MN 56431

Frank Lee Girard,
Respondent,

Filed July 29, 1986
Wayne Tschimperle, Clerk
Minnesota Appellate Courts
S Y L L A B U S
1.

A minor

child's name may

be changed

only

when

the

change promotes the child's best interests.
2.

Trial

courts

must

make

particularized

findings

supporting their reasons for granting or denying an application
to change a child's surname.
3.

When

the

custodial

parent

objects

to

changing

the

child's surname and the evidence does not show that the failure
to change the name will be detrimental to the preservation of
the child's relationship with the noncustodial parent, it is in
the best interests of the child to follow the custodial parent's
preference.
Reversed.
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Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judgef Leslie,
Judge, and Nierengarten, Judge, with oral argument waived.
O P I N I O N
CRIPPEN, Judge

Charlene

Hoglund

appeals

from

the trial court's judgment

changing the surname of her two minor children from Hoglund to
Girard, the surname of the children's biological father.

We

reverse.
FACTS
Appellant Charlene Hoglund and respondent Frank Girard lived
together for about six years and had two children, Orville Lee,
born February 18f 1981, and Bobby Jean, born October 11, 1982.
Sometime after Bobby Jean was born, respondent moved out of the
home where he had been living with appellant and the children.
In November 1985, appellant brought a paternity action against
respondent.

Respondent

acknowledged

his

paternity

and

was

accordingly adjudicated the father of the children.
In the same proceeding, respondent petitioned the court to
change the children's surname from Hoglund to Girard.

The trial

court record shows that when the children were born, both were
given appellant's surname of Hoglund.

In their daily life, they

have always used the surname Hoglund.

Respondent, however, also

testified
children

that

"all

"Girard"

his

when

he

friends
was

and

living

everybody"
with

called

appellant.

children have lived continuously with appellant;

the
The

respondent has

visited with them about once a month since he and appellant
stopped living together.
- 2-

Respondent testified that he does not care if the children
continue to use Hoglund as their surname in their daily lives,
but that he nevertheless wants their name to be changed legally
to Girard.

He explained that he was the only son in his family

that named a son after his father, that his father had expressed
a dying wish that the Girard name be carried forward, and that
he wanted to fulfill his father's wish.
ongoing

desire

to marry

appellant

He also expressed his

and

raise

the children

together with her, and stated that even if he and appellant do
not marry, he still wants

the children

to have his name in

recognition that he is their father.
Appellant

testified

that she objected

to a change in the

children's surname and that the change would confuse them.
testified

that

She

the children, now ages 5 and 3, are not old

enough to meaningfully tell her which name they would like to
keep.

In regard to respondent's desire to marry her, appellant

testified that she would "like to give it a try" but that she
would first want to live with respondent "for awhile and see how
things work out."
In

addition

to

the

parties'

testimony,

the

court

also

considered a letter from an Aitkin County Family Service Agency
social worker, which
remain Hoglund.

recommended

that the children's surname

The social worker wrote that the benefit of

changing the name is outweighed by the possible confusion and
disruption that could ensue, and that because appellant has been
and continues to be the primary parent of the children, her wish
to maintain the Hoglund name should be granted.
- 3-

The

trial

respondent

court

are

issued

findings

the parents

of the

that

two

appellant

children

and

and
that

respondent "is desirous of changing the surnames of the children
to Girard."

The court then ordered that the children's name be

changed to Girard*

Charlene Hoglund appeals from the judgment

entered upon the court's order.
ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering that
the children's surname be changed?
ANALYSIS
A trial court shall grant an application for a change in a
minor child's name unless the court finds that the change is not
in the best interests of the child.
(1984).

See Minn. Stat. § 259.11

Applying the statutef the Minnesota Supreme Court has

held that the "welfare of the children must ultimately be the
controlling consideration in any change of status."

Robinson v.

Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 35, 223 N.W.2d 138# 140 (1974).
In Robinson, the court focused on the "significant societal
implications"

of

changing

a

child's

name

from

the

natural

father's name following the divorce of the child's parents and
the grant of custody to the child's mother.

The court noted

that the "link between a father and child in circumstances such
as these

is uncertain

at best, and

a change of name could

further weaken, if not sever," the bond between a noncustodial
father and the child, ^d. at 35-36, 223 N.W.2d at 140.
This concern is notably absent from the present case, where
the children's parents were never married and the children have
- 4-

never regularly used their father's name.
not oppose change but seeks it.

Here the father does

In addition, independent of the

surname of the children, both parties agree that respondent has
established

a

positive

and

loving

relationship

children, that both children know respondent

with

the

is their father,

and that he sees the children on a regular basis.

Respondent's

testimony that his primary interest is to fulfill his father's
wishes and not to ensure that the children identify with the
name Girard in their daily lives also indicates that the name
change would not affect his ongoing parental relationship with
the children.
In

1981,

the

supreme

court

took

elucidate [its] decision in Robinson."

the

"opportunity

to

In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d

298, 301 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).

In

Saxton,

be

granted

the

"only

interests."
child's

court

reaffirmed

when

Ici.

surname

the

that

change

a

name

promotes

change
the

should

child's

best

In Robinson, the court said that change of a
over

the

objection

of

a

parent

should

be

considered with "great caution" and only where "the evidence is
clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child
necessitates
N.W.2d

such

at 140.

change."
Saxton

Robinson,

specified

302 Minn,

several

at

36, 233

factors that trial

courts may consider in determining the child's best interests.
Further, the court stated that trial courts need not limit their
consideration to those factors, but that they should set out
their reasons for granting or .denying an application to change
the child's surname.

Id.
- 5/?-<#

Other than stating that respondent desired the name change,
the

trial

court

here

did

respondent's petition.

not

state

reasons

for granting

Most notably, the trial court made no

findings on the best interests of the children.
Two of the factors articulated

in Saxton are particularly

important here, namely, the length of time the child has borne a
given name, and the difficulties, harassment or embarrassment
that the child may experience from bearing the present or the
proposed name.*
the

Hoglund

testified

The record shows that the children have borne

name

that

difficulties
recommendation
recommendation

throughout
a

change

for

of

them.

from
that

the
the

their

lives

name

The

trial

would

record

Aitkin

and

County

court

that

cause

also

appellant
adjustment

includes

social

specifically

the

worker,

a

waited

to

receive before holding the hearing on the proposed name change,
which states her belief that any benefit of a name change would
be outweighed

by

the possible

confusion

and

disruption

that

could result from the change.
In addition,

absent

evidence

that

the

change

will

be

detrimental to the preservation of the children's relationship
with their father, we see no reason to put aside the preference
expressed by their custodial parent, the children's mother.

It

1. The other factors noted in Saxton do not bear on the present
case. They are: (1) the child's preference (the children
here are too young to express a preference); (2) the effect
of the change on the child's relationship with each parent
(the relative unimportance of this factor has already been
noted in the discussion on Robinson); and (3) the degree of
community respect associated with the present and the
proposed names (neither parent testified that one name
evokes a greater degree of community respect than the
other).
- 6-
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is in the best interest of such young children to provide them
with stability and continuity.
705, 711 (Minn. 1985).

See Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d

The preservation of the family unit as

they have always known it, including having the same name as
their

custodial

parent,

is

an

element

of

that

continuity.

Appellant has been and continues to be primarily responsible for
the welfare of the children.
evidence

does

not

show

Under these circumstances, the

that

the substantial

welfare of the

children necessitates a change of name.
The absence of particularized findings as well as the trial
court's focus on respondent's desire to change the children's
name

indicates

doctrine

that

without

the

trial

considering

court
its

relied

on

development

the Robinson
in

Saxton.2

Robinson refers to
the natural
to have his
as well as
knowing his

and appropriate desire of the father
children bear and perpetuate his name,
* * * the desirability of the child
own parentage.

Robinson, 302 Minn, at 36, 223 N.W.2d at 140.
in discussing

Saxton, however,

that concern, refers to the effect

of a name

change on the child's relationship with each parent.
309 N.W.2d

at

301.

Moreover,

although

this

Saxton,

factor was

of

primary concern in Robinson, both that case and Saxton included
2. At the hearing on the petition, counsel for appellant cited
Robinson but not Saxton to the court as controlling
authority.
The judge declined to make a decision
immediately following the hearing, stating that he first
wanted to review Robinson.

- 7-

ri-so

it as only one among several factors to be considered.
302*

Here,

however,

the

court's

findings

do

not

IxJ. at
reflect

consideration of any other relevant factors.
The trial judge's questioning of the parties also reveals
his reliance on a mistaken presumption of law that may have
influenced the court's final decision.

The judge expressed his

belief that if the parties were to marry, the children's names
would automatically convert to Girard.

This is error;

because

the surname on the children's birth certificates is Hoglund, an
application

for a name change is necessary regardless of the

parties' marital choices.

See Minn. Stat. § 259.10 (1984).

The

merit for a change of name may increase upon the marriage of the
parties;

however, until application is made and granted, their

names will continue to be Hoglund.
We

recognize

perpetuate

his

primarily

aimed

the

validity

family's
towards

of

name.

respondent's

This

Orville,

desire,

who

was

desire

to

however,

is

named

after

respondent's father, and not towards Bobby Jean, making it even
less clear

that

the change

interests of both children.

of name would

be

in the best

As noted in Robinson, the children

may some day voluntarily decide to change their name to Girard.
See Robinson, 302 Minn, at 38, 223 N.W.2d

at

141.

At the

present time, however, the evidence is insufficient to show that
a change of name would promote their best interests.
D E C I S I O N
The trial court erred in granting respondent's petition to
change the surname of the parties' children over appellant's
- 8-
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objection.

Respondent's reasons for desiring a change of cde

children's names are not clear and compelling evidence that the
substantial welfare of the children necessitates a change.
Reversed.

zaQj^iite
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Supreme Court of Utah

athleen Jacobson and the State of Utah,
y and through Utah State Department of
•ocial Services,
Appellants,
-vs.-Jail Jacobson,
Respondent.

Fourth Judicial District Court
Utah County,
Civil Case No. 67, 957
Supreme Court Case No.

Affidavit in Support of Motion for Change of Title of Action

I, Kathleen Hamby, execute this affidavit in support of my Motion for
Change of Title of Action, and state:
1. I am the Appellant in the action.
2. I assumed the surname Hamby following my marriage to Richard
L. Hamby on July 16, 1973.
3. I gave the surname Hamby to my son born of that marriage, Clint,
and he has born it since his birth on July 9, 19?4.
4. Following my divorce from Richard Hamby on July 13, 1979, I
continued to use the surname Hamby.
5. On June 14, 1983 I gave birth to another son, Kelly Lynn, and
named him with the surname Hamby. Kelly's biological father is Gail
Jacobson.
6. On November 29, 1983 I married Gail Jacobson and assumed the
surname Jacobson for the period of November 29, 1983 to October 20,
1984 at

which time I resumed the use of my name Hamby.

7. Since October 20, 1984 I have used the name Hamby, I consider it
my name and I never intend to use any other surname than Hamby for the

remainder of my natural life,
8. I have all of my identification in the surname Hamby, including
my Utah driver's license, my Utah chauffeur's licence, my employment
and social security records, my bank records and all other identification.
9. All my friends, family and business associates know me as
Kathleen Hamby.
10. I signed papers connected with this lawsuit in the name Jacobson
only becaase my attorney Donald Elkins, who prepared the papers, told me
that I had to sign my name as Jacobson.
11. When I was divorced from Gail Jacobson on April 11, 1985 my name
change was included in the divorce decree.
12. On April 13, 1985 following my divorce I gave birth to another
son, Kevin, whose biological father is Gail Jacobson.
Dated this

A

7 day of May, 1986.

athleen Hamby
Hambv /
Kathleen
P.O. Box 188
Goshen,
Utah
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